Aléatoires, futiles et biaisées

Misconceptions arise from a lack of awareness. When I came to Sweden, I had a sparse knowledge of what Iran was really about. Some historic stuff about Persia – it’s uniqueness and difference from the Arabic world – and some other news about the Iran-Iraq war. I had not expected to get to know so much Iran… while living in Sweden.

Iran is actually a large country, with 74 million inhabitants, home of one of the oldest civilization. Its people are thriving for Western culture and even if modern Iran gives a strong role to the supreme leader, and its Islamic implications, Iranians are usually rather secular.

Most Westerners could summarize their knowledge of Iran by the following:

Ahmadinejab is a populist nutcase, no doubt about it. His rhetoric is just as insane as Chavez’s anti-imperialistic speeches or Gadaffi’s African Kingdom fads. Like any bully in the schoolyard, it’s not much worth playing his game, we’d better try to outsmart him.

In a nutshell, the U.S. (and the U.K.) are largely responsible for the rise of the Islamic Revolution in 1979 and the overthrow of the Shah (put in place by the U.K. and the U.S.). The US-backed Shah was reigning over Iran in an old-fashioned king style, but most of the resent behind the popular support of the coup came from an anti-US feeling, rather than anti-Shah in the first place. Just as the lessons of Nicaragua (Reagan’s Contra:1981), Chile (Nixon’s Pinochet: 1973), Afghanistan (Karzai) or Iraq (Talabani) should teach a good lesson: swift regime changes by cohersitive force seldomly lead to the swift (real) political change expected. And history has told us that lots of people have to perish throughout those exercises, crushing the hopes for change from its main actors: the citizens.

Sure, Ahmadinejab has fire-power, most likely some form of nuclear weapon. Sure, he said that he wanted to wipe Israel of the map. I am not pretending that those threats are nil. They are part of the equation of what is there to be done. But again, we have to outsmart him. Many western state actors, motivated by voters, strategic alliances (often with Israel) and ideology, won’t see any ground for negotiation or compromise with the Iranian regime. I personally see no other way than creating a long-term strategy for the Iran-West relationships. This strategy should include a greater role from strong middle-eastern moderate regimes, such as Turkey and Jordan. The dichotomy arising from the omniscient bilateral « US-rest of the world » diplomatic and military relationship is a remnant of the past. The U.N. has its big flaws (heavy bureaucracy and slow action, when even that action is considered), but the does not mean that a multi-lateral diplomatic model should necessarily be wiped away. The rise of new diplomatic powers, such as Brasil, can contribute in creating an organic web of ties where momentum and agreements can be obtained, in cooperation with the democratic aspect of the United Nations.

I am not writing this to lecture about Iran. Those facts can be found in books and newspapers. What I want to underline here is what I discovered about Iran, through the people I have met in Sweden. Of course, people who can leave on exile are a tiny portion of the population, most likely an unrepresentative sample. That said, I was surprised to see so much openness from Iranians, a warmth that you would not first expect from similarly different cultures from the West*. The girls are brilliant and gorgeous, the guys are challenging and fun. Curiosity from its intellectuals, hope and energy from its youth: Iran has a bright future ahead with such people. I believe that the youth is the barometer for tomorrow’s political class: Iran will not be where it is in 20 years. We just have to make sure that the ground does not turn sour meanwhile…

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* I hate to say « the West ». But in lack of a better term, I have to turn to it…